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Writing a tribute to Paul Giannelli is no easy feat. In truth, that 
is partly because his retirement is irrefutable evidence of the ap-
proaching autumn of my own academic career. But it also presents a 
challenge for less overtly selfish reasons: Paul Giannelli simply has 
written so darn much, and so well. 
It is impossible to concisely measure the impact of a scholar as 
prodigious as that of Professor Giannelli. I will thus leave it to others 
to address his profound contributions to the substantive criminal law, 
juvenile law, evidence, and Ohio’s criminal justice system. Instead, I 
plan to focus on the work that first brought Paul Giannelli to my own 
attention fifteen years ago, and from which I have immensely profited 
and learned from ever since: his work in expert and forensic evidence. 
I have vague recollections of Professor Giannelli’s name appearing 
in my law school textbooks and clinical courses, but at that time I 
was focused less on the author of an idea than on mastering the idea 
itself. It was not until I embarked on my own journey from practice to 
academia that Paul’s work affirmatively stopped me in my tracks. I 
was a young defense lawyer then, in possession of a Westlaw password 
and the dream of an academic career. Forensic science had just cap-
tured my attention, and that of the nation. The well-known television 
series “CSI: Crime Scene Investigation” debuted in the fall of 2000 
and forever secured a place for forensic science in popular culture.1 
The national DNA database had just begun to take root, and forensic 
evidence was becoming an increasing part of criminal proof. It felt like 
the country was waking up to the centrality of scientific evidence in 
criminal cases, and, as an aspiring scholar, I had a notebook full of 
unanswered questions. 
I started using that Westlaw password in search of answers. As I 
immersed myself in the existing literature, little piles of articles sorted 
by author sprouted up around my apartment. Among these paper 
brownstones stood one Empire State Building—or perhaps I should 
say, one Key Tower. Paul Giannelli’s writings on forensic evidence, on 
expert witnesses, and on the rights of defendants as regards scientific 
proof were prolific and unmatched. He wrote about polygraphs and 
hypnosis, about ballistics and comparative bullet lead, about 
 
†  Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.  
1. CSI: Crime Scene Investigation, IMDb, http://www.imdb.com/title/ 
tt0247082/?ref_=nv_sr_1 [https://perma.cc/J758-AKGK] (last visited 
Apr. 3, 2018).  
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bitemarks and fingerprints, about DNA and handwriting. There was 
not a corner of the field that he had not developed.  And the archi-
tecture of his work was distinctive. Paul’s authoritative voice re-
flected his training in forensic science and his comfort with scientific 
methods, and that alone distinguished him from so many others 
writing in the same field. 
As I pored through what felt like the entirety of his writings in 
forensic science, I quickly learned that there was not a discipline that 
he had not covered, or an angle that he had not probed. Every time I 
had an idea or question, it turned out that Paul Giannelli had already 
written an article that had contemplated its answers. The cycle con-
tinued for weeks—each new line of inquiry that rose up in my mind 
was subsequently quashed by another one of his tours de force. At 
some point, my dispiritedness at being so consistently surpassed 
turned to curiosity. Who was this person who had written so 
exhaustively, persuasively, and profoundly about what I had hoped to 
carve as my niche in the law? 
Eventually, I had the honor of actually meeting Professor 
Giannelli, and learning that he was as generous in person as he was in 
intellect. He does not jealously guard his fiefdom, but rather welcomes 
all those younger scholars for whom his work has lit an academic 
path, as it did for me. I have had the pleasure of working with him on 
several amicus curiae briefs, and at every turn he has inspired me to 
think as deeply and carefully as he did at the beginning of my 
journey. 
Perhaps most remarkably, Professor Giannelli has achieved in his 
career that to which most scholars aspire, but all too often eludes us: 
to see our work affect the actual workings of the law. When I first 
came to Professor Giannelli’s scholarship in the 2000s, his perspective 
was largely considered an outlier. Professor Giannelli’s work system-
atically exposed the failings of forensic disciplines, the patent in-
adequacy of support for forensic science performed on behalf of the 
criminal defendant, and the laughable failure of the rules and insti-
tutions intended to safeguard the integrity of forensic evidence. 
But as the work of Professor Giannelli and several key others 
gained increasing attention and accrued scholarly plaudits, the pur-
veyors of faulty forensics gradually found themselves on the defensive. 
The advent of DNA testing and the revelations of the Innocence 
Project movement provided definitive proof of the critiques that 
Professor Giannelli had long made. Suddenly, those early outlier 
positions became the accepted wisdom, and his work served as a 
blueprint for reforming a system desperately in need of overhaul. 
Professor Giannelli did not take direction from his study of the law; 
the law took direction from studying Professor Giannelli. 
For example, in 1980, Professor Giannelli criticized the Frye test 
for admitting scientific evidence in a piece in the Columbia Law 
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Review. He argued against the commonly proposed alternative to 
Frye, which would look only to relevancy, and warned that such an 
approach would admit too much unreliable evidence.  Instead, he pro-
posed his own approach:  
[T]he proponent of the evidence should have the burden of 
production and persuasion. Second, the issue of whether the 
burden of proof has been satisfied should be decided by the 
judge as a preliminary question of fact. The last, and 
undoubtedly the most difficult, issue is the standard of proof. As 
an initial proposition, the Frye test must be rejected. . . . The 
prosecution in a criminal case should be required to establish 
the validity of a novel scientific technique beyond a reasonable 
doubt.2 
Thirteen years later, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.,3 the Supreme Court essentially agreed, overturning Frye.4 
Daubert affirmed that the proponent does in fact bear the burden, 
that the court must decide admissibility as a preliminary fact, and 
that the ultimate touchstone was in fact reliability (although provable 
only by a preponderance of the evidence). 
In 1988, Professor Giannelli warned, in the Ohio State Law 
Journal, that “[t]he routine admission of laboratory reports can be 
justified only if the presumption of reliability that generally attaches 
to business and public records also applies to these reports. Such a 
presumption is unwarranted.”5 He acknowledged hurdles to a more 
rigorous standard of exclusion in light of existing evidence rules, but 
nevertheless argued that: 
Even if laboratory reports are admissible under a hearsay 
exception, the Confrontation Clause may require exclusion. A 
hearsay declarant is, in effect, a ‘witness against’ the accused. 
Thus, a literal interpretation of the Confrontation Clause would 
preclude the prosecution from introducing any hearsay 
statement, notwithstanding the applicability of a recognized 
 
2. Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. 
United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1197, 1247 
(1980). Interestingly, Professor Giannelli proposed a lesser standard—a 
preponderance—for civil litigants and criminal defendants.  
3. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
4. Id. at 589. 
5. Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Laboratory Reports in Criminal 
Trials: The Reliability of Scientific Proof, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 671, 700 
(1988). 
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hearsay exception. The Supreme Court has never adopted this 
interpretation.6 
Of course, twenty-two years later in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,7 
the Supreme Court adopted just this interpretation of the Confron-
tation Clause.8 Melendez-Diaz, and the line of cases that followed, 
recognized the unique relationship of the forensic analyst to the 
criminal case described by Professor Giannelli’s analysis, and antici-
pated by his prescient prediction of Confrontation Clause concerns.    
 These examples are hardly isolated. In 1997, Professor Giannelli 
called for an independent crime laboratory system.9 In 2009, a blue-
ribbon panel of experts convened by the National Academy of 
Sciences heard exhaustive evidence on the state of forensic science and 
made that very same proposal the capstone of their recommen-
dations.10 In 1991, he tackled the inadequacy of criminal discovery;11 
in 2017, the Department of Justice agreed, acceding to the advice of 
the National Commission on Forensic Science (on which he served) to 
provide more extensive documentation with regards to scientific evi-
dence.12 In 2004, he criticized the anemic implementation of the right 
to expert assistance for defendants;13 recently the Supreme Court 
seemed to inch closer toward a more expansive vision of that constitu-
tional right.14  
 Over the years, Professor Giannelli’s work has exposed the hypoc-
risy of those declaiming “junk science” in civil cases while tolerating 
 
6. Id. at 685–86. 
7. 557 U.S. 305 (2008). 
8. Id. at 329. 
9. Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: 
The Need for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 
439 (1997). 
10. Nat’l Research Council of the Nat’l Acads., Strengthening 
Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (2009). 
11. Paul C. Giannelli, Criminal Discovery, Scientific Evidence, and DNA, 44 
Vand. L. Rev. 791 (1991). 
12. See Memorandum from Sally Q. Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Dep’t 
Prosecutors & Dep’t Forensic Sci. Pers. (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www. 
justice.gov/archives/ncfs/page/file/930411/download [https://perma.cc/B 
Q7G-S68R]. 
13. Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance in a 
Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 1305, 1417–19 
(2004). 
14. McWilliams v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 1790, 1801 (2017) (reversing the decision 
of lower courts on the basis of inadequate implementation of the existing 
standard for expert assistance and avoidance of the question of broader 
protection). 
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equally unfounded “science” in criminal cases;15 the chicanery of 
particularly notorious forensic examiners;16 and structural infirmities 
in the delivery of forensic evidence.17 And over the years, each and 
every one of his views has been, in time, embraced and accepted as 
the best practice by leaders in the field. 
As political factors have propelled state actors to reconsider the 
validity of conventional forensic science disciplines and work toward 
improving the delivery of forensic science to criminal courts, Paul 
Giannelli has stood ready to lend his immeasurable expertise. He has 
never contented himself with being an ivory tower academic, but has 
always equally busied himself with the lawyers, judges, and legislators 
responsible for actually creating and implementing the law. He served 
with distinction as a reviewer, advisor, author, or committee member 
for every landmark investigation involving forensics including: the 
National Research Council’s landmark report on DNA Evidence in 
1996, the National Academy of Sciences report on Strengthening 
Forensic Science in 2009, and the ABA’s Criminal Justice Standards 
on Biological Evidence. When at last political actors mustered the will 
to create the National Commission on Forensic Science, it surprised 
no one that Paul Giannelli was appointed to one of the few spots 
reserved for legal scholars. 
In sum, Professor Giannelli’s towering presence in the field—so 
long a beacon to those like myself who aspired to follow in his foot-
steps—will endure long beyond his well-earned retirement. As a more 
seasoned academic than when we first crossed paths, I cannot help 
but envy the arc of his career. Not just the productiveness, the dis-
tinction, or the many accolades—which describe most accomplished 
scholars by the time they retire—but what must be the immensely 
satisfying feeling of entering retirement from his special perch. To 
reflect at the end of a body of work that opens as utterly contrarian 
and closes as thoroughly orthodox, and to know that you have helped 
bend the law your direction. Paul Giannelli has had that rare fortune 
of shaping and improving the law that he found, and thus the justice 
and fairness of the criminal justice system in which it operates, as the 
work that he has generated became the foundation for reforms aimed 
at remedying the problems that inspired him. It has been my honor 
and pleasure to have had the opportunity to watch from the sidelines, 
 
15. Paul C. Giannelli, “Junk Science”: The Criminal Cases, 84 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 105, 111–12 (1993). 
16. See Giannelli, supra note 9, at 442–43, 449–50, 454–55 (discussing Fred 
Zain, Ralph Erdmann, and Michael West). 
17. See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, Scientific Evidence in Civil and Criminal 
Cases, 33 Ariz. St. L.J. 103, 105–06 (2001); Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic 
Science, 33 J. L. Med. & Ethics 535, 535–41 (2005). 
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then join him in the game, and now salute him as he leaves the field 
as the next generation carries the ball forward. 
